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Mr. H. Chapman Rose:
Assistant Secretary of the Treasury
Treasury Department
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Rose:

I appreciate your memorandum of 2 July 1954 on the subject of the introduction of "suitcase type" atomic weapons into the country and the opportunity afforded us to comment on your memorandum to the Secretary of the Treasury.

Your basic conclusion that it is unlikely that an enemy would use this type of clandestine attack except as part of a conventional strike represents the consensus of the intelligence agencies. This conclusion is in conformity with the Special National Intelligence Estimate on Soviet Capabilities for Attack on the U. S. Through 1957 (SNEE 11-2-54), which was approved by the Intelligence Advisory Committee on 16 February 1954. We have received no information up to the present time which would cause us to doubt the continued validity of this conclusion.

Nevertheless, we are continuing to give the problem of clandestine delivery of weapons of mass destruction careful study in order to pin point those activities of our potential enemies which may indicate plans for such delivery or attempts to carry such plans into effect. We believe that counter-measures should also receive continued consideration.

Sincerely,

DHS Review Completed.

Allen W. Dulles

Original written in O/S/
Retyped: 10 July - ODAI-jm

Debt:

Original - added

3. Signers - 1

1 - ODAI

Office 1 - 1/2/54

CONCUR:

Robert Amory, Jr.
Deputy Director/Intelligence

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

Mr. H. Chapman Rose
Assistant Secretary of the Treasury
Treasury Department
Washington 25, D. C.

HRB

Dear Mr. Rose:

I appreciate your memorandum of 2 July 1954 on the subject of the introduction of "suitcase type" atomic weapons into the country and the opportunity afforded us to comment on your memorandum to the Secretary of the Treasury.

Your basic conclusion that it is unlikely that an enemy would use this type of clandestine attack except as part of a conventional strike represents the consensus of the intelligence agencies. Essentially this same conclusion ~~is in agreement with the~~ was reached in the ~~same~~ Special National Intelligence Estimate on Soviet Capabilities for Attack on the U. S. Through 1957 (SNIE 11-2-54), which was approved by the Intelligence Advisory Committee on 16 February 1954. We have received no information up to the present time which would cause us to doubt the continued validity of this conclusion.

Nevertheless, we are continuing to give the problem of clandestine delivery of weapons of mass destruction careful study in order to pin point those activities of our potential enemies which may indicate plans for such delivery or attempts to carry such plans into effect. We believe that counter-measures should also receive continued consideration.

Sincerely,

Allen W. Dulles

*7-1-54
J.W.D.*



TREASURY DEPARTMENT

WASHINGTON

ASSISTANT SECRETARY

SECRET

My dear Mr. Dulles:

I am enclosing for your information a copy of a letter and memorandum Secretary Humphrey has sent Mr. Robert Cutler on the subject of introduction of "suitcase-type" atomic weapons into the country.

We would very much appreciate any comments you may have.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive ink that appears to read "Humphrey Bogart".

Assistant Secretary of the Treasury

Honorable Allen W. Dulles
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington 25, D. C.

Enclosures



THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
WASHINGTON

SECRET

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Dear Mr. Cutler:

Thank you for your letter of May 13, 1954, forwarding the newspaper account of the simulated introduction into the United States of "suitcase-type" atomic weapons. We are very glad to have this material for consideration in our study of this problem.

Although we are not terribly worried about what one newspaper-man can do, this is certainly illustrative of the serious problems we face in defending against the smuggling of such weapons. As you know, we have representation on the committee studying these matters. The aspect illustrated by the newspaper account has been brought to their attention. When any new recommendations or factors are developed in this study, we will, of course, promptly notify the National Security Council. In the meantime, I think you might be interested in the enclosed memorandum.

Sincerely yours,

(Signature) J. W. Tamm, Jr.

Secretary of the Treasury

Mr. Robert Cutler
Special Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington 25, D. C.

Enclosure

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THE SECRETARY

Mr. Rose

Letter dated May 13, 1954, from Robert Cutler on the simulated introduction into the United States of "suitcase-type" atomic weapons.

Mr. Cutler enclosed with his letter to you of May 13, 1954, a newspaper account of how a newspaperman and photographer were able to smuggle into the United States at San Ysidro, California, ten simulated "suitcase-type" atomic weapons, and thereafter place them undetected in strategic locations in the greater Los Angeles, San Francisco and other California areas.

As you know, the problem of preventing the introduction into the country of this type of atomic weapon is a serious one, and it is virtually impossible to protect our thousands of miles of seacoast, as well as land borders, completely in this respect. Frankly, I am not particularly worried that this one newspaperman was able to bring ten metal pipes into the country unnoticed when he was not motivated to take the precautions which an unfriendly smuggler of such equipment would take, and had no fear of the consequences which might follow if he were detected. As it is virtually impossible to achieve 100 percent protection, we must work on the best assumptions we can develop. If "suitcase-type" atomic weapons are going to be introduced into the country, it is felt that this will be done only as a part of a large strike accompanied by air power. There would not be this type of isolated introduction of such weapons into the country, but there might be a number of coordinated introductions. A number of simultaneous or coordinated introductions would, of course, substantially raise the possibility of detection. Our precautions against this type of smuggling today are such that there is a substantial possibility of detection, as evidenced by the recent seizure by Customs at Miami of another newspaperman's equipment similar to this. The Soviets must know this. They must also know that the detection of the smuggling of such an atomic weapon would risk war, and it seems unlikely that they would take this risk to introduce one isolated weapon or group of weapons without it being part of a big strike.

This is all part of the larger general problem of the introduction of atomic weapons into the country other than by air strike which is now and has been for some time the subject of discussions and study by a committee on which we have representation together with Atomic Energy Commission, Central Intelligence Agency and Defense. This specific problem is also being studied by an advisory group to the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security on which both Customs and Coast Guard have representation. Among other things, this advisory group is making a survey of the installation at Customs ports of entry throughout the United States of experimental devices for the detection of "suitcase-type" atomic weapons.

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I am attaching for your information the memorandum Commissioner Kelly has given me on this question. When any new recommendations or factors are developed in connection with this problem, we will promptly advise the National Security Council.

I suggest that copies of your letter to Mr. Cutler and copies of this memorandum be sent to Allen Dulles and Lewis Strauss so that we may have the benefit of their comments.

Attachment

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OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

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2	AD/SI	HAC	8 July
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signature - "on an urgent basis."

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OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

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REMARKS:

The attached letter has been concurred in by
 ONE, per attached draft.

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